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PARTIES
The caption of the case on the cover shows all of the
parties.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction by virtue of Sec. 78-2A-3 (h) ,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Third Judicial District Court, Judge Richard K. Moffat,
entered a decree of divorce

(R. 113) , which would be final and

absolute July 23, 1986, but reserving the issues regarding the
division of property, alimony, child support, etc., for later
determination.

On February

Supplemental Decree awarding

3,

1988, Judge

Moffat

the Respondent

entered a

(plaintiff below)

alimony for an indeterminate period.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Appellant

(defendant below)

contends

that under

the

facts of this case the Court erred in awarding permanent alimony.
That is the sole issue on appeal.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES
There

are

no

determinative

constitutional

provisions

or

statutes involved.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the Supplemental Decree of Divorce,
entered by the trial court under date of February 3, 1988 (R.
452) awarding Respondent permanent alimony.

Appellant appeals,
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contending that based on the facts in the record, it was an error
to make the alimony permanent•
B.

COURSE OF PROCEDURE

The case was bifurcated

for trial.

The court entered a

final decree of divorce, effective the 23rd day of July, 1986
(R. 113).

Thereafter, on the 15th day of April, 1987, a trial

was held on the other issues (R. 256). The trial court rendered
its Memorandum Decision on May 27, 1987

(R. 334); Findings of

Fact were initially entered on June 29, 1987 (R. 36C) but objections were

filed

thereto

(R. 375)

and

new

Findings

of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental Decree cf Divorce ^ere
entered February 3, 1988 (R. 452-469).
C.
The

trial

DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT

court

in

its

Supplemental

Decree

of

Divorce

awarded permanent alimony in the following language:
14. Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff as alimony the
sum of $1,050 per month commencing with the month of July,
1987, for a period of one year, at which time alimony shall
reduce to $800 per month for a period of one year, at which
time it shall reduce to $650 per month. Plaintiff's entitlement to alimony shall continue until such time as
plaintiff should remarry, cohabit or die or defendant should
die, whichever event occurs first, but to be subject to
modification pursuant to applicable Utah law.
D.
Unfortunately

there

RECORD ON APPEAL
is no trial

court reporter's notes have been lost.

transcript, because

the

The parties, therefore,

proceeded under this Court's Rule 11(g) and stipulated to the
major facts (R. 616). That stipulation (which is set forth next
below) was approved by the trial court on March 31, 1989 (R.
615).

In addition to the facts set forth in the stipulation, the

3

parties stipulated that the depositions of the parties could be
published

and transmitted

as a part of the record on appeal

(R. 620) and, of course, the pleadings and memoranda filed by the
parties a-re before the court.

The stipulation of facts is as

follows (R. 616):
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff/Respondent was born in Seattle, Washing-

ton, on June 13, 1947; the Defendant/Appellant was born in
Utah on March 16, 19 47.

Both have been and now are in good

health.
2.

The parties were married on the 9th day of Septem-

ber, 1970.

Three children have been born as issue of that

marriage; namely:

Erin Van Wagoner, born March 19, 1975;

Gavin Van Wagoner, born January 25, 1978; Morgan Van Wagoner, born January 22, 1981.
3.

In the Spring of 1969 while Respondent was attend-

ing Brigham Young University, she applied and was accepted
for training as a stewardess for Pan American Airlines.

It

was the intent of Respondent prior to meeting the Appellant
to become a stewardess.

While waiting

for Pan American

training school to begin in September, she met the Appellant.

A romantic relationship developed

and the parties

through discussions agreed that the Respondent should change
her plans and remain in Provo.

She did so, rescheduling the

Pan American training school in Florida to the Summer of
1970.

Thereafter through the fall of 1970 and the spring of

1971 Respondent enrolled in a three-semester program at the
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Brigham Young University, which was necessary for a teaching
certificate.

Such

a certificate was obtained

after the

parties moved to North Carolina, and Respondent was certified to teach school in Utah and North Carolina,
has not maintained

Respondent

the certificate and would need to be

recertified if she were to teach.

She has, however, com-

pleted four to five hours of the nine hours required for
recertification.
4.

Immediately before her marriage to the Appellant,

Respondent was working part-time as
Restaurant in Prove, Utah.

a waitress at Sambo's

The parties were engaged in 1970

and the Respondent quit her job at Sambo's to begin the
aforementioned

three-semester

program

at

BYU

needed

to

obtain her Utah teaching certificate.
5.

Appellant

completed

work

degree in history at the BYU.
worked part-time

as a teaching

for

an

undergraduate

While attending school, he
assistant

Department and part-time as a fry cook.

in the Flistory

The summer immedi-

ately before the marriage Appellant worked full-time as a
fry cook and Respondent worked full-time as a hostess at a
local restaurant.

Appellant was accepted in the Fall of

19 70 to study law at Duke University.
6.

In the

travelled
began

law

summer

of

1971 Appellant

and

Respondent

to Durham, North Carolina, where the Appellant
school

studies

and

Respondent

began

teaching.

Between the fall of 1971 and the spring of 1974 Respondent
taught elementary school in the Orange and Durham County
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school districts in North Carolina.

She worked full-time as

a teacher while Appellant was in law school.
7.

Appellant's law school expense was paid for by a

combination of scholarship money from Duke University and
gifts from his parents.
8.

After

Appellant

graduated

from

law

school

the

parties moved to Salt Lake City, where he was employed by a
local law firm.

From this point forward Appellant began to

provide almost 100% of the marital income.
9.

In 1977 Appellant accepted employment with a Los

Angeles law firm, O'Melveny & Myers and the parries moved to
Los Angeles.

The work assignment from that law firm enabled

the parties to travel rather extensively, at the law firm's
expense, to San Francisco, and an extended trip to Europe.
10.

In

1980

Appellant

changed

his

employment

by

quitting his position in Los Angeles and taking a position
with a lav/ firm in Salt Lake City, Utah.

The parties again,

following plaintiff's employment, moved from Los Angeles to
Salt Lake City, where they purchased
Salt Lake Country Club.

a large home near the

From 1980 to the filing of this

action for divorce Appellant worked as a lawyer and Respondent remained
children.

in the heme caring for the parties' three

During this period they purchased many items of

furniture and three new automobiles.

They also were able to

continue to travel extensively.
11.
Respondent

After

their

became

return

involved

to Salt Lake

City

in

of

a

number

in 1980
volunteer
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projects, including serving as president of the local PTA,
became a member of a book club and performed in a number of
regular church assignments,
12.

The parties separated in June of 1985.

13.

In 1986, after the parties separated, Respondent

began working part-time at the Salt Lake Tribune.

She was

working on an average of three days a week on an 8 hours a
day basis and was paid $8 an hour.

Her gross annual income

from this was $9,984.
14.

There was testimony from a qualified witness that

Respondent had favorable and immediate employment prospects
as a teacher, and would be capable of making a minimum of
$16,000 per year over a nine-month period.

Appellant has

chcsen not to seek employment as a teacher and as a matter
of personal choice has chosen her current work at the Salt
Lake Tribune and to pursue a career in newspapers.
15.

Respondent's work at the Tribune is in the Promo-

tions Department, and includes responding to teacher requests to visit classrooms as one method of teaching the
teachers how to use the newspapers as a teaching tool in the
classroom.

Respondent also from time to time works as a

substitute teacher.

She worked in this capacity a total of

about 15 days in the last half of 1986.
16.

Respondent started her work with the Tribune in

October of 1986.
part-time.

She is paid around $40 per day and works
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17.

The

parties

stipulate

that

the

deposition

of

Appellant and the deposition of Respondent may be published
and transmitted together with the exhibits as a part of the
record.
18.

David

Dorton,

a

valuation

expert,

testified

concerning the value of the law degree earned by Mark Van
Wagoner

during

the

marriage.

His

testimony, which

was

recapped in Exhibit P-23, was that the present value of Mark
Van Wagoner's law degree was the sum of $343,200.

If it

were %tax adjusted, it would reduce the value to a present
value of $247,100.

We next note the Respondent's deposition:
Respondent's

deposition was

taken

January

6,

1987.

She

testified as follows:
She attended B.Y.U. from 1965 to 1969 and obtained a B.A.
degree in Humanities (Depos. p. 5). She taught school in North
Carolina while Appellant attended law school (Depos. p. 6). She
dropped her teaching certificate in 1985 or 1986 and needed to be
recertificated (Depos. p.6). She has taken four or five hours of
the required nine hours for recertification (Depos. p. 7) .
She worked sporadically after the marriage

(Depos. p. 8).

In the Spring of 1985 she worked as a teacher approximately 30 to
34 days.

After the parties separated in June 1985, however, she

made no attempt to find work.

In refusing her request for more

temporary alimony in August of 1986, the trial court cautioned
the Respondent that the existing financial status of the parties
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was

such that

she should

exercise

efforts

to obtain

gainful

employment. (See Order filed, but unsigned, R. 165, 27.)

Accord-

ingly, she started at the Salt Lake Tribune in October of 1986
(Depcs. p. 6 ) , where she took a part-time job that paid $9,984
per year.
Next we refer to the Court's Memorandum Decision

(P. 334)

where the trial court stated:
"It is the view of the Court that the parties, even prior to
their separation, were living at a financial level that
could not be sustained. If that is a fact, it is even more
obvious that having separated, they cannot continue to each
be sustained at the same level that existed before. . . . "
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in awarding
permanent alimony.
completed

Respondent

sufficient

additional

teacher's certificate.

is a college graduate and has
college

work

to

obtain

her

The trial court expressly fcund (P. 447)

that Respondent is a healthy, able bodied person, capable of
gainful employment.

At a minimum, she had favorable and immedi-

ate employment prospects as a teacher and would be capable of
making a minimum of $16,000 per year over a nine-month period.
As she has demonstrated, permanent alimony award permits her the
luxury of working only part-time throughout the lifetime of the
parties.

The court's award does not encourage her to become

independent or to further her education, as she once represented
to the court she intended to do (see Appendix B) .

To the con-

trary, she has elected to take a part-time job with the Salt Lake
Tribune.
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During
earnings.
divided.

their

marriage,

she

fully

shared

in

Appellantfs

The property accumulated by them has been equitably
The fact that at the time of the divorce they were

living beyond

their means

should

permanent subsidy to her.

not be

justification

for a

She is capable of supporting herself

and after a reasonable adjustment period the alimony should have
been terminated.
ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH LAW PROVIDES PERMANENT ALIMONY ONLY UNDER CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES.
A.

This is Not a Case of Equitable Restoration.

The most permanent of alimony is an award of the future
earnings of the spouse.

The Respondent sought such an a<*ard by

asking for an interest in the Appellantfs law degree.
rightly rejected that argument.

The court

It is clear under the Utah cases

that a professional degree is not property.

See Petersen v.

Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987); and Gardner v. Gardner,
748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988).

On the other hand, this court has

held that where the wife sacrificed current income to help the
husband advance his education and was then abandoned, without
sharing his increased income, the court can provide rehabilitative alimony.

See Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App.

1988).
In Martinez, the husband left a full-time job to return to
school.

He later decided to stay in school and apply to medical

school.

Medical school was seen by the wife as a threat to the

marriage

because

of

the

four

years

husband's absence from the family.

of unemployment

and

the

She agreed to the hardship
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with the assurance that some day he would make it up to her; that
they would have greater assets and income.

He graduated in 1981.

Two years later she filed for divorce.

The court later awarded

her alimony for a period of five years.

On appeal, the award was

made permanent for two reasons.

First, that the wife had very

limited

and work

education

(high school)

experience; second,

because she had not participated in sharing the income increased
by her sacrifices to send her husband to medical school.
In its decision the court cited to the Petersen case, supra,
where Judge Orme recognized that a case might arise whereby one
spouse was reaching a high level of income just at the time cf
the divorce, rather than the more frequent situation where the
parties had enjoyed the benefits of the husband's medical education for a number of years.
The court then cited with approval a Colorado case, In re
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), which the
court said typified the recurring issue:
. where divorce occurs shortly after the professional
degree is obtained, traditional alimony analysis would often
work hardship, because while both spouses had modest incomes
at the time of the divorce, the one is on the [threshold] of
a significant increase in earnings. Moreover, the spouse
who sacrificed so that the other could obtain a degree is
precluded from enjoying the anticipated dividends the degree
will ordinarily provide. . . .
In such cases alimony
analysis must become more creative to achieve fairness, and
an award of "rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" alimony, not
terminable upon remarriage, may be appropriate.
The court next noted on page 77 that in the Martinez case
there had been little property accumulated and because the higher
income

level would

reasonably

be

reached

after

the divorce,

plaintiff was entitled to a more permanent remedy.

To support
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that idea, the Court next cited Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357
N.W.

2d 250

(S.D. 1984),

in which

the Supreme Court of

South

Dakota held:
. . ."in a proper case," the trial court should consider
"all relevant factors" in awarding "reimbursement or rehabilitative alimony."
These included "the amount of the
supporting spouse's contributions, his or her foregone
opportunities to enhance or improve professional or vocational skills, and the duration of the marriage following
completion
of
the
nonsupporting
spouse's
professional
education." Id. at 262
The

Court

also

statutes

which

permit

borrowed
their

reasoning
trial

from

some

to

grant

courts

Wisconsin
an

order

requiring maintenance payments to either party after considering
several factors, among which are:
(4) The educational life of each party at the time of the
marriage, and at the time the action is commenced.
(5) The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance,
including
educational
background,
training,
employment
skills, work experience, length of absence from the job
market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time
and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party to find appropriate employment.
(6) The feasibility that the party seeking maintenance can
become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably
comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and, if so,
the length of time necessary to achieve this goal.
The Utah court then in Footnote 10 to its opinion said:
We emphasize the specific nature of the facts presented in
this case and stress that equitable restitution would not be
awarded in the more frequent case where the marriage lasted
for many years after the professional degree had been
granted. There, sufficient assets would have been accumulated and an appropriate distribution to the requesting
spouse would enable that spouse to share in the economic
benefits earned as a result of the degree.
While the Court is talking about a special remedy of equitable

restitution,

the

context

in

which

the

discussion

occurs
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clearly indicates that these are the criteria to be considered in
awarding alimony and in establishing its duration.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Jackson observed

that in

Petersen v. Petersen, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals had held
that

an advance

degree

is not marital

property,

subject

to

division upon divorce, but acknowledged that there may be situations where equity demands an extraordinary award of alimony in
order to compensate a spouse who endures substantial financial
sacrifices or defers her own education to help the other spouse
in obtaining an advance degree.

He cites Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738

P.2d 238, 241 (Utah App. 1987) holding that:
.This might occur where: (a) the parties mutually
•endeavor to increase one spouse's earning capacity, but at
the time of trial the spouse who has benefitted from the
parties' endeavors is merely on the threshold of a substantial increase in earnings, Petersen, 737 2d at 242 n.4; or
(b) there is insufficient marital property from which to
make a compensatory award to the contributing spouse,
[citing Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988)]
Judge Jackson then noted:
In such cases, the spouse who has made substantial financial
sacrifices and contributions to increase the earning capacity of the other spouse is entitled to recompense for those
contributions that are beyond the duty of support normally
associated with marriage, less any benefits received,
[citing cases from Wisconsin and New Jersey]
B.

The Factors Permitting Permanent Alimony are Missing
In This Case.

Apparently no Utah case has reversed a trial court's award
of permanent alimony.

In those several cases where the trial

awards have been made permanent, the Court has detailed

the

factors to be considered

in explaining why permanent alimony

should have been awarded.

These cases highlight extreme situa-

tions like a wife who was approaching normal retirement age, or
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was in poor health.

In those cases she lacked the training, or

health, necessary to permit her to enter the job market and earn
anything but a meager salary.

In other cases, like Martinez, the

wife had made substantial sacrifices to enable the husband to
earn a graduate degree in medicine or in law.

She had "stuck by

him" with the express promise of participating in the increased
earnings, but they divorced and she would not otherwise have
participated in the promised higher earnings.
These decisions do net hold, nor even suggest, that in all
cases alimony should be permanent.

Rather, by negative implica-

tion they suggest that where, as here, the wife did net make
substantial

sacrifices to enable the husband

graduate work; where

the marriage

endured

to complete his

for a

substantial

period of years after the husband entered the practice of his
profession; where the wife enjoyed the benefits of his higher
earnings; where the parties had accumulated property which was
equitably divided at the divorce; and where the wife had the
necessary

training and

skills so that she can enter the job

market and support herself, alimony should end at some fixed
future date.
This case should be controlled by Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738
P. 2d 238 (Utah App. 1987).

Significantly, the decision in this

case was not available at the time of the trial.

There, the

trial court had found that the husband's medical degree was a
marital asset and had ordered Dr. Rayburn to pay Mrs. Rayburn her
share of the asset, $45,000, at $750 a month "to maintain her
life style for a period of adjustment".

The initial trial court

14

decision awarded Dr. Rayburn all of his retirement fund, but two
weeks later the trial court altered its decision on the retirement plan and ordered Dr. Rayburn to pay one-half of the net
present value of the retirement plan ($56,850) to Mrs. Rayburn in
five annual installments of $11,370, plus interest.

The decree

awarded no alimony.
The Court of Appeals, citing Petersen v. Petersen, 73 7 P.2d
237, reversed the trial court and reaffirmed its holding that an
advanced degree is not marital property, but may be considered as
a factor in alimony analysis.

The Court, however, found that

permanent alimony was inequitable for Mrs. Rayburn.

Mrs. Rayburn

had a post graduate degree; she had worked during Dr. Rayburnf s
internship and some of his residency, "but upon the birth of
their first child, she stopped working full-time and worked only
occasionally and on a part-time basis, throughout the rest of the
marriage." (738 P.2d at 239)
In awarding alimony for five years, the Court noted that
while Mrs. Rayburn was unemployed, "she had been employed and was
well-educated".

(738 P.2d at 241).

The monthly payments were

necessary to maintain her life style "for a period of adjustment".

The Court based the five-year limit on the time it would

take her to complete additional education and "until the parties1
youngest child was in school all day."

(738 P.2d at 241)

In this decision the Court noted:
We acknowledge that there will be situations where an award
of non-terminable rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony
would be appropriate . . . . However, this not such a case.
Although Mrs. Rayburn worked periodically during the marriage, she did not endure substantial financial sacrifices
or defer her own education to help him obtain the degree.
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In addition, Mrs, Rayburn shared the financial rewards
permitted by her husband's advanced degree for several
years. Those rewards also resulted in the accumulation of
considerable real and personal property during their marriage, which was equitably divided upon their divorce. The
award of temporary alimony, at $75 0 per month for a maximum
of five years, adequately meets Mrs. Rayburnfs support needs
and is readily sustainable under the criteria outlined in
Jones.
The reasoning of Rayburn fits the facts of this case.
Rayburn, the Respondent is well-educated.
and during the marriage.
day.

As in

She has worked before

The youngest child is now in school all

Moreover, the Respondent endured no substantial financial

sacrifices, nor did

she defer her own education tc help the

Appellant obtain his law degree.

Also, like Rayburn, the Respon-

dent here has shared in the financial rewards permitted by the
Appellant's education.
resulted

Those rewards here —

as in Rayburn

—

in the accumulation of considerable marital property

which the Appendix A hereto shows was equitably divided.
In Rayburn the court awarded temporary alimony of $750 per
month for a maximum of five years, which, said the court, "adequately meets Mrs. Rayburn's support needs".

According to the

Court, that award "is readily sustainable".

The Rayburn case

dictates that the same criteria be applied to the facts of this
case.

This would require a reversal of the award of permanent

alimony.
Other cases direct the same result.

In Jones v. Jones, 700

P. 2d 1072 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court reversed the trial court
which had awarded monthly alimony for five years at $1,000, $750
for five additional years, and $500 thereafter.

At page 1075 the
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court noted that three factors must be considered in fixing a
reasonable alimony award:
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the wife;
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income
for herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to provide support.
In addressing the second factor —

the wifefs ability to

produce a sufficient income for herself, the ccurt noted:
. . .She was married at the age of 23 and was 52 years old
at the time of trial. The paid work she did in the early
years of the marriage and the miscellaneous functions she
performed at the pharmacy and gift shop were all relatively
unskilled in nature. . . .She has no professional training
and few marketable skills. . . .The wife has no independent
income. It is entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman
in her mid-50fs with no substantial work experience or
training will be able to enter the job market and support
herself in anything even resembling the style in which the
couple had been living.
In Olson v. Olson, 704 P. 2d 564 (Utah 1985), the Supreme
Court gave a permanent award, in part because the wife:
. . .had no reasonable expectation of obtaining employment
that would enable her to support herself at a standard of
living even approaching that which she had during marriage.
She had only worked at minor clerical jobs for two brief periods
over 20 years apart.

The Supreme Court concluded that the trial

court's alimony award was inequitable and remanded the case for
further findings consistent with the opinion.
In Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988), the
trial court's order automatically decreased monthly alimony.

The

parties had been married thirty years and were "nearing fifty
years of age".

She had no income.

The trial court made only one

conclusionary finding to the effect that the wife was "capable of
meaningful employment in the future".
Appeals noted that:

In reversing, the Court of
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• . .She had no earnings in the year before trial; she has
only a high school education and average job skills to
market. Her ability to work is impaired by the disability
of their adult daughter. She will have difficulty finding
and retaining a full-time job. If employed, her earnings
would undoubtedly be meager for a long period, given her
lack of education, training or work experience. (p. 1334)
Each of these cases shows that permanent alimony is justified only where there are unusual economic circumstances like
poor health, disabled children, advanced age, poor skills, or
weak education.
II.

None of those things affects this case.

APPLICATION OF THE COURT'S CRITERIA TO THIS CASE PRECLUDES
AN AWARD OF PERMANENT ALIMONY.
A.

Respondent is Well Educated, in Good Health, and has
Deliberately Taken a Part-Time, Low-Paying Job.

The Court's decisions suggest that an award of permanent
alimony is proper where there are exigent circumstances such as
advanced
suggest

age or ill health.
that without

those

Those

same decisions conversely

circumstnces

permanent

alimony

is

improper.
The
healthy,
(R. 447).

trial

court

able-bodied

expressly
person,

found
capable

that
of

Respondent
gainful

was a

employment

Respondent, as a matter of personal choice, is cur-

rently employed only three days a week at the Salt Lake Tribune,
earning only $800 a month (R. 447). Like Mrs. Rayburn, Respondent has a college degree and she also has had sufficient postgraduate education to qualify for a teacher's certificate in Utah
and North Carolina (Stip. of Facts S[5) . She taught full time for
three years while Appellant was in law school (Stip. of Facts 26)
and as a substitute teacher thereafter (Resp. depos. p. 11). She
has favorable and immediate employment prospects as a teacher and
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would be capable of making a minimum of $16,000 a year over only
a nine-month period.

This uneconomic choice is one made possible

by the alimony award.
she has completed
required

four or five hours out of the nine hours

for recertif ication

depos. p.6).
home

Her teaching certificate has lapsed, but

(Stip. of Facts

S3

& and Resp.

She operated a silk flower business through her

(Respondent's

Depos. pp.

28-30).

When

the

trial

court

suggested that Respondent seek employment (R. 334), her response
was a part-time job with the Salt Lake Tribune.

She has stayed

in that job.
B.

Respondent Made no Sacrifice to Appellant's Education.
She Shared Greatly in the Benefits of his Work.

There is not in this case evidence of any unusual sacrifice
on the part of the wife so that the husband could get a professional degree.

She did not remain uneducated and untrained.

At

the time of the marriage Respondent had already completed the
work for her Bachelor's degree from the Brigham Young University
(Respondent's Depos. p.5). After their marriage on September 9,
1970, both parties enrolled in school and both worked
dent's Depos. pp. 6-7).

(Respon-

Appellant completed the work necessary

for his Bachelor's degree and Respondent completed two of the
three

semesters

of

work

needed

for

a

teacher's

certificate

(Respondent's Depos. p.6). Appellant received a scholarship to
Duke University Law School and with that scholarship and gifts
from his parents paid for the tuition and expenses of the lawdegree (Stip. of Facts 27).

She taught school during the three

years he was in law school and contributed to their basic living
expenses

(Respondent's Depos. ^6) .

Upon the completion of law
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school he immediately obtained employment.

She discontinued work

outside the home and they started raising their family (Stip. of
Facts 28).
Thus, this is not a case where the wife worked to pay for
the husband's degree and then early on —
higher earnings —

the parties divorced.

married nearly sixteen years.
tion.

at the threshold of his
The parties here were

They both completed their educa-

From the beginning the Respondent shared in the benefits

resulting from Appellant's higher earnings.

They traveled exten-

sively, including an extended trip to Eurcpe

(Stip. of Facts

5S9/10).

They acquired property and shared therein through the

division

made

by

the

court.

(See

Appendix

A

hereto)

The^

separated in June of 1985, but liberal provisions were made for
her support by a temporary order

(R. 28) .

The divorce became

effective July 23, 1986 (R. 114), but the alimony issues were not
settled at that time and the temporary order which gave her
$2,864. per month for herself and the children continued.
Supplemental
(R. 469) , so

Decree
that

of Divorce was
there

really

was

entered

February

provision

The

3, 1988

thus made

for

approximately eighteen months before the Supplemental Decree cf
Divorce was entered and alimony was awarded.

Then the court

awarded her $1,500 per month for the children, $1,050 per month
alimony for herself and ordered Appellant to pay the Respondent's
attorney fees in the amount of $17,246.23.

The alimony was to

decrease to $800 per month the next year and to $650 per month
thereafter until the Respondent remarries or cohabits, or until
one of the parties dies (R. 467,468).

Under these facts, and following the Court's prior decisions, she should not be given a lien on his future earnings for
the rest of their lives.

She is not a woman hopelessly dependent

on Appellant until she finds another husband.
encouraged

to

be

independent

and

She should be

self-reliant.

After

a

reasonable adjustment period of five years, the alimony ought to
be terminated.

Indeed, in her proposed settlement filed with the

trial court, Respondent contemplated alimony "for a period five
years

or

education"
B.)

until

[she]

(R. 93) .

completes

anticipated

advanced

degree

(This is also included herein as Appendix

With the temporary order and the supplemental decree Respon-

dent has already had fairly liberal support since November 27,
1985 (R. 30) .

Where a wife is educated, competent, skilled and

healthy, it is unreasonable and unnecessary to give her a lien on
her former husband's earnings for the rest of their lives.

Such

an award is a great disincentive to find independence through
education

or

career

advancement;

it

is

an

invitation

to be

dependent and unproductive.
Even if she resumed her career as a teacher and increased
her income to $16,000 or more per year for nine months of work,
under current decisions that would likely not be the kind of
change of circumstances which would permit modification.

In this

regard see Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620 (1972),
where the Utah Supreme Court dealt with this issue.
holding, the Appellant may

never be relieved

obligation if Respondent elects not to remarry.

Under that

of the alimony
The children are

now of an age where work outside the home is practicable.

In
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four years the oldest child will be of legal age (Stip. of Facts
52).

In ten years all three of them will be.
A more reasonable and economic approach was taken in Oregon

in Hinrichs v. Hinrichs, 588 P.2d 130 (Or.App. 1978).

There the

court held that spousal support for five years should be adequate
to permit the wife to obtain additional training necessary to
accomplish readjustment and to gain employment.
for permanent

spousal support was modified

Thus, a decree

to terminate

years from the date of the decree dissolving the marriage.

five
The

property division involved placing value on the husband's interest in his business, including its income potentialr

ard then

balancing the disparity in division by awarding permanent alimony
to the wife.

The court held that it is not the policy of the law

to give the wife "a perpetual lien against her former husband's
future income."

(p. 131). See also Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d

379 (Utah App. 1983), p. 383.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully urge the court to place a reasonable expiration date on the alimony award.

Respondent has already had

liberal support under a temporary support order and the Supplemental Decree of Divorce.

Specifically, she was awarded $2,864

per month for child support and alimony during the pendency of
the divorce.

The divorce was granted effective July 23, 1986,

but alimony was not fixed at that time and the temporary award
continued.

The court did not enter its Supplemental Decree of

Divorce awarding alimony until February 3, 1988.

That decree

ordered the Appellant to pay to Respondent alimony in the sum of

$1,050 per month commencing with the month of July, 1987, for a
period of one year, at which time the alimony v,as reduced to $800
per month for a period of one year, and then was reduced -co $650
per month.

The trial court ordered that Respondent's alimony

entitlement

shall continue until such

time as the Respondent

shall remarry, co-habit, or die, or the Appellant should die,
whichever event occurs first.
The trial court found that Respondent is able bodied and
employable.
per year.

She is working now and earning approximately $9,984
She has a college education qualifying

teacher's certificate.

her

She shared in Appellant's higher earnings

from the time he got out of college until the divorce —
of 16 years —

for a

a period

and she shared in the marital assets through a

liberal division of the joint property.

Under the facts of this

case Respondent should not be awarded a lifetime lien on the
Appellant's earnings.
We respectfully

submit that the alimony should terminate

five years after July 1, 1987.
Dated this *j, day of May, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD W. CLYDE
CRAIG W. ANDERSON

By<_ i jji en t^d

ol <—

L

/

Attorneys for Appellant , , C
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I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be
mailed, postage prepaid to Respondent's Attorney, B. L. Dart,
Suite 1330, 310 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, this / 7
day of May, 1989.

Salt Lake Countv Utah

^ _ _ - —
A^orSeffo^pWiff
310 South Main Street
S u i t e 1330

-\

[ ^ \ L U ^ J
\J

FE3 3
8yj

1988

^ ^ ^ g (R r ? ? "
^
X W^
-> D e e p e r *

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo—
CAROL VAN WAGONER,
Plaintiff,

:
:

SUPPLEMENTAL
DECREE OF DIVORCE

v.

:

MARK 0. VAN WAGONER,

:

Civil No. D85-3792

Defendant,

:

Judge Moffat

oooOooo—The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
on the remaining financial issues on the 15th day of April, 1987,
at 9:00 a.m., plaintiff and defendant both appearing in person
and represented by counsel and the Court having heard testimony
from each of the parties and various witnesses and exhibits
having been introduced and the matter having been argued and
submitted and taken under advisement, and the Court having made
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

On or about September 15, 1986, this Court

entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of
Divorce which reserved issues of custody and financial issues.

QG0452

We have not duplicated pages 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6,
which deal primarily with child custoday, but
they are in the Record, at pc-ges 4 52-457.

Center may designate a replacement mediator mutually acceptable
to the parties.
The costs for the services of Augie Plenk will be
shared by the parties'with Mark to pay 70 percent (70%) and Carol
to pay 30 percent (30%) of Plenk's charges, provided that charges
for which Carol will be responsible will not exceed the sum of
$100 in any month.

Insurance provided by either party against

the cost of the mediation will be a credit to that parties share
of the cost.

In addition, Mark agrees to pay for, and the

parties agree to engage in four visits with Augie Plenk to assist
Augie Plenk in obtaining a background in the case with the
children available to participate as suggested by Augie Plenk.
The marties mutually agree that Augie Plenk will be provided with
any information and materials which have been created in this
case including evaluation reports and psychological reports.
Each party shall notify the other party as soon
as reasonably possible of any illness requiring medical attention
or any emergency involving the minor children.
Each party agrees to give the other party sixty
60 days notice of intention to change county of residence.
3.

During the marriage the parties acquired certain

household furnishings and effects and.other personal property
which are divided as follows:
a.

Plaintiff shall receive and after receipt

shall be fully responsible for:
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(i)

The 1977 Volvo automobile•

(ii) The bank accounts presently in
plaintiff's name.
(iii) The sum of $500 which represents onehalf of marketable securities held by defendant and valued at
$1,000.
(iv)

All household furnishings and effects

and other marital personal property presently in plaintiff's
possession, except as provided in Paragraph 3(b)(iv) below.
(v)

One-half of the parties joint IRA

account, which half is valued at $1,000.
(vi)

The Delta Airlines stock or any proceeds

from its sale.
(vii)
(viii)

The parties' 1984 income tax refund.
The piano which shall remain with

plaintiff but in the event it is to be disposed of by the
plaintiff at any time in the future or is to be stored for any
period of time and not utilized for music lessons for the
children it shall become the property of the defendant and shall
be promptly surrendered to the defendant by the plaintiff free of
any liens and encumbrances.
(ix)

All other household furnishings and

effects and other personal property acquired by plaintiff
subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 1985.
b. Defendant shall receive and after receipt
shall be fully responsible for the following:
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(i)

The bank accounts presently in

defendant's own name.
(ii)
(iii)

Cash in defendant's possession.
The marketable securities held by

defendant valued at $1,000.
(iv)

All of the household furniture

furnishings and effects and other personal property presently in
defendant's possession and the following household furniture,
furnishings and effects and other personal property presently in
plaintiff's possession, namely, the JVC video camera, two pieces
of artwork of defendant's choice, one Lladro sculpture of
defendant's choice and defendant's tools other than tools
necesary for yard care such as rake, hoe, shovel, etc.
(v)

Gavin's bedroom furniture shall remain

with Gavin so long as it is in his use but shall be transferred
to the possesion of defendant if not used by Gavin.
(vi)

All other household furnishings and

effects and other personal property acquired by defendant
subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 1985.
4.

During the marriage of the parties defendant

became involved in a wrongful death action involving a sign which
fell from a Smith's Food King store.

No order is made at this

time concerning the proceeds, if any, from this litigation to
which defendant may become entitled and at such time as this
case is resolved defendant is ordered to notify plaintiff so that
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at that time the Court can make a determination of whether any
distribution of such proceeds is appropriate•
5.

The house and real property at 2195 Parleys

Terrace, Salt Lake City, Utah, is ordered to be listed
immediately for sale with Kay Berger, a multiple listing
realtor.

Plaintiff is ordered to cooperate with Kay Berger in

doing whatever Kay Berger desires or requests in the way of
cooperation to assist in the sale of said property, including but
not limited to maintaining the residence in a neat, attractive
and orderly fashion as to enhance its likelihood of a sale.
Until the house and real property at 2195 Parleys
Terrace is sold, plaintiff shall be responsible for payment of
the first mortgage obligation and each of the parties shall be
responsible for 50 percent of the insurance and 50 percent of the
taxes.

If either party pays more than his or her proportionate

share of insurance or taxes, the overpayment shall become a lien
against the defaulting party's proceeds from the home.
Upon the sale of said house and real property the
funds received therefor shall be escrowed and applied as follows:
a.

To pay all expenses of the sale such as real

estate commissions, title reports and title insurance, proration
of taxes and other standard closing costs.
b.

The note to Vivian McCarthy will be paid in

full or assumed by the buyer.
c.

The balance will be allocated one-half to the

plaintiff and one-half to the defendant.
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d.

From defendant's one-half there shall be paid

from escrow in the following priority:
(i)

B. L. Dart# Esq., as provided herein in

paragraph 18.
(ii)
(iii)

Defendant's obligation to the IRS.
Defendant's obligation to Zions First

National Bank.
e.

If either party shall have paid any debt or

obligation of the other relating to said house and real property,
or relating to the two obligations to Zions First National Bank
or the 1985 income tax return on which the parties have a shared
liability, any such payment shall be reimbursed with interest at
eight percent per annum from the time of the advance until the
time of payment.

The payments shall be made directly from the

escrow.
f.

The balance of plaintiff's allocated share

shall be distributed to plaintiff and the balance of defendant's
allocated share shall be distributed to defendant.
6.

The interest of the parties in the real property

located on the Southest corner of Third South and West Temple
Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah (the "West Temple Property"), is
awarded one-half to plaintiff and one-half to defendant.

In the

event of sale, the parties are ordered to share equally in the
sales proceeds and in the future until such sale, each party is
ordered to pay equally in the costs and expenses applicable to
this property.

In the event either party fails to pay his or her
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share of any assessment against the property ten days prior to
the due date, the other party may pay such assessment and it
shall work a forfeiture of the non-paying party's interest in the
property to the party making the payment.

Defendant is currently

the partner in the West Temple property and is ordered to provide
to the plaintiff notice as soon as he receives it of any
assessment so that plaintiff will have as much notice as possible
of any assessment amount and due date.
7.

Defendant is awarded all right, title and

interest in and to his partnership interest in the law firm of
Van Wagoner and Stevens, as well as his proportionate share of
all assets and income of such firm provided that this award of
the partnership interest does not supersede or in any way affect
the provisions of paragraph 4 of this Decree of Divorce relating
to the Smith's Food King suit.
8.

Various debts and obligations have been incurred

by the parties during the marriage which shall be assumed and
paid as follows:
a.

Plaintiff shall pay, settle or otherwise

compromise if not already done and shall indemnify defendant from
the following obligations:
(i)

All debts allocated to plaintiff under

prior orders of this Court.
(ii)

All currently outstanding debts incurred

by plaintiff subsequent to the separation of the parties on June
21, 1985, in connection with charge cards or similar accounts.
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(iii)

The outstanding principal and interest

on any loans incurred by plaintiff subsequent to the separation
of the parties on June 21, 1985.
(iv)

All separate tax liabilities incurred by

plaintiff subsequent to January 1, 1986.
(v)

All other debts incurred by plaintiff

prior and subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21,
1985.
(vi)

One-half of the outstanding principal

and interest owing to Zions First National Bank for a balloon
payment, which half is valued at approximately $2,900.00.
(vii)

One-half of the obligation owing to

Zions First National Bank regarding Taylor, which half is valued
at approximately $10,825.00.
(viii)

One-fourth of the currently

outstanding income tax liability for the 19 85 tax year in the
approximate sum of $2,000 subject to defendant providing
documentation of the exact value of this obligation.
b.

Defendant shall pay, settle or otherwise

compromise if not already done and shall indemnify plaintiff from
the debts and obligations owing as follows:
(i)

All debts allocated to defendant under

prior orders of this Court.
(ii)

All debts incurred by defendant prior

and subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 1985
in connection with charge cards or similar accounts.
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(iii)

The outstanding principal and interest

owning on any loans incurred by defendant subsequent to the
separation of the parties on June 21, 1985•
(iv)

All separate tax liabilities incurred by

defendant subsequent to January 1, 1986.
(v)

One-half of the outstanding principal and

interest owing to Zions First National Bank for a balloon
payment, which half is valued at approximately $2,900.00.
(vi)

One-half of the obligation owing to

Zions First National Bank regarding Taylor, which half is valued
at approximately $10,825.00.
(vii)

Three-fourths of the income tax

liability for 1985, which three-fourths is in the approximate sum
of $6,000 subject to defendant providing documentation of the
exact value of this obligation.
(viii)

Except as to the Smith's Food King

case which is to be governed solely by paragraph 4 hereof, and is
not modified hereby all liabilities incurred in connection with
defendant's law practice.
c.

Any debts and obligations not listed in

paragraph 8(a) or 8(b) above shall be paid as follows:
(i)

Those incurred on behalf of plaintiff

should be paid, settled and compromised solely by plaintiff.
(ii)

Those incurred on behalf of defendant

should be paid, settled and compromised solely by defendant.
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We have not duplicated Pages 15, 16 and 17, but they
are ±h the Record at pages 466, 4 67 and 4 68.

offset, but is merely directing that the offset not be made
without court approval insofar as alimony and support money is
J

concerned.

.J.

DATED thi

day o

APPROVAL AS TO FORM:

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLSY
CLERK

EDWARD W. C L Y D E H
Attorney for Defendan

L
ClerK
gjepuiy
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Husband ( )

Wife (X)

PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF PENDING DIVORCE LITIGATION
Child support $1,000/child

Total (per month)$ 3,000

Alimony SI ,000*

Total (per month)$ 1,000

*Alimony for a period of five years or until plaintiff completes
anticipated advanced degree education.
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION:
There should be an equitable division of all the assets of
the parties following a complete accounting by defendant
with the division of property to be effectively half to each
party. The decree of divorce should have the following
provisions:
1.
Either provision for a new car for plaintiff or alimony and
support payments to allow for a monthly payment on a new car.
2.
Provision that any alimony and support award have an
escalator based on any increases in defendant's income.
3.
Plaintiff retain all items of personal property in the home
after appropriate credit to defendant for half the value.
4.
In addition to support, defendant be responsible for
maintenance of health and accident insurance on the children and
be responsible for one-half of any non-insured medical,
orthodontia and dental expenses.
5.
The decree should provide for a withhold-and-deliver
provision relating to defendant obligation for support.
6.
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees in this
divorce proceeding.
Grand Total (per month) $ 4,000
I, CAROL VAN WAGONER, proposed the above settlement.

Plaintiff

